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Abstract
Lew Smith, the chairman of a privately owned Canadian processor, must decide whether his
company will build a plant in the United States. He has been asked to do so by one of his major
customers, Loblaw. The company has been making many improvements to its operations but it’s
performance has been hurt by the Free Trade Agreement between Canada and the United States. The
company has been doing very well, however, as it shifts its focus from making private label to
controlled label. Is now the right time to expand the business into a foreign market? © 2002 Elsevier
Science Inc. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Just before Llewellyn Smith hung up the phone, he said, “George, we really appreciate this
terriﬁc opportunity you are presenting us with and we will think about it carefully.” It was
November 3, 1992, and he had been talking to George Sulty of the Loblaw organization.
George had called to again encourage E. D. Smith and Sons Ltd. (EDS), one of its Canadian
suppliers, to open a plant in the United States (US). By doing so EDS would be able to supply
the US licensees of Loblaw’s merchandising program with products. Loblaw was a major
Canadian food retailer which also owned a chain of supermarkets in the midwestern US.
Loblaw, which had annual sales of over two billion dollars, was having great success
licensing its “President’s Choice” program to retailers across the US.
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PII: S1096-7508(01)00056-8Llewellyn Smith, or Lew as he was known to friends, was chairman of E.D. Smith and
Sons Ltd.. The family-owned company was located in Winona, Ontario, Canada. This town
was just east of Hamilton and was on the edge of the “Niagara fruit belt,” so-called because
of the tender fruits grown in the area. The company manufactured grocery products,
specializing in pie ﬁllings, jams, and sauces. In 1992 it had sales of $76 million, comprised
mostly of products consumers bought either under EDS’s own brands or under the controlled
labels of food retailers. The company had a reputation with consumers for the high quality
of its products.
Lew was in a thoughtful mood as he leaned back in his chair and looked out his ofﬁce
window at the company’s red brick plant. It stood out in sharp contrast to gray of the Niagara
Escarpment which loomed up behind it. He thought about the many changes made at the
company since he had become its chairman in 1986. He wondered whether the company was
ready for a new plant in the US and how well it would ﬁt with the company’s evolving
strategy.
2. History of the company
EDS had been founded by Ernest D’Israeli Smith in 1882. Each generation of the family
since then had a son interested in carrying on the business. In 1983, Llewellyn S. Smith, 31
years old and the only son of Llewellyn Smith Sr., was appointed president of the company.
His father, who had been president for 27 years, became chairman. Then in the summer of
1986, his father retired and Lew became chairman of the company.
In 1986 the company faced ﬁnancial, marketing and management challenges. Financially
the company was heavily levered with a debt to equity ratio of 2:1 and its assets were pledged
as security for the debt. Much of the debt had been incurred so the company could buy the
equity held by some family members. Company sales were stagnant though industry sales
were growing at 2 percent per year. EDS’s core products were losing market share and
tonnage shipped was decreasing. Meanwhile, costs were rising as a percent of sales. Lew
expected marketing problems would become even more severe should the proposed Free
Trade Agreement between Canada and the US be signed. Finally, management of the
company was still adjusting to Lew’s management style following the retirement of his
father, Llewellyn Sr. His father, who had been internally oriented, was a hands-on manager
who knew everything that was going on in the company. His skills were complemented by
a professional management team he had hired. Lew, on the other hand, was externally
oriented. He had chosen to focus on strategy, leaving the daily operations of the business to
those under him. He felt that things would go well as long as good people were in place and
they were allowed to make decisions. He saw his role as supporting the management team
in the decisions it made.
On taking over as chairman in the fall of 1986, Lew Smith and Richard Sexton put
together a program to deal with the situation the business found itself in. Sexton,
formerly a senior partner in Cooper and Lybrand’s Hamilton, Ontario ofﬁce, had been
hired as president when Lew was promoted to the chairmanship of EDS. The two
examined the company in detail from an ofﬁce they rented in Burlington. Then, working
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“serving the customer.”
3. Changes made between 1987 and 1992
Many changes were made under Lew and Richard’s leadership between 1987 and 1992 as
their plan was implemented. These changes repositioned the company in the grocery product
manufacturing industry–the industry is described in the Appendix. Because the changes
started in 1987, a year before the signing of the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between
Canada and the US, EDS was ahead of its competitors in making changes to deal with the effects
of free trade. The company’s success in adjusting to the changing environment are shown in the
gross measures of EDS’s performance (see Exhibit 1). Lew recalled the various functional
changes that had been made.
3.1. Procurement
In 1987, 60 percent of EDS’s sales revenue came from products made with agricultural
produce grown in Ontario and sold to processors under conditions speciﬁed by the province’s
marketing boards–even fruits grown on EDS’s 179 acre farm next to its plant were subject
to these regulations. Forty percent of its sales revenue came from produce that EDS bought
fresh. This produce had to be processed immediately on receipt because it was highly perishable.
By 1992, EDS dealt with no fresh produce and had leased its own farm to others. Instead,
partially processed products such as tomato paste and preserved strawberries were bought
from primary processors in Chile, Mexico and the US. Some of these products were bought
under long-term contracts that committed EDS to buying from particular suppliers. In return
these suppliers had built processing plants producing ingredients of the quality that EDS
required. Other products were bought under arrangements that seemed most appropriate
given market conditions.
Exhibit 1
Measures of change in E.D. Smith and Sons, Ltd, 1987–1992*
Year Sales Employees
Full time Part time
$Millions Number
1987 87 375 250
1988 85 240 314
1989 70 240 175
1990 60 165 107
1991 70 168 100
1992 76 200 15
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EDS’s principal processing steps were blending ingredients, cooking them, and then
packing the cooked product in containers. These activities were conducted in 7 cooking areas
and on 11 packing lines. All activities were housed in a 175,000 square foot plant which had
the capacity to produce 5 million cases annually. A 225,000 square foot warehouse formed
part of the processing complex.
In 1987, processing operations were spread over three stories in the plant. Processing was
further complicated because several different product lines used the same pieces of equip-
ment. Most of the equipment was antiquated and cooking was done in batches using open
kettles. This equipment was fully employed during the three months of the harvest season
when the plant operated with three shifts a day while the rest of the year it operated with only
one shift a day. Labour needs during peak periods were met by hiring a large number of
part-time workers (see Exhibit 1). Once processed, the products went into ﬁnished goods
inventory from where they were drawn over the rest of the year. The average annual value
of this inventory in 1987 was $19 million.
At the time, quality was deﬁned by management and managers chose to make products
that they considered to be of premium quality. Lew said that producing this quality was
possible because workers approached their work as craftsmen. Many of the full time workers
had a family tradition of working at EDS with several generations working there at any one
time. Many of the part time workers were the children of these workers.
By 1992, the number of product lines, products and sizes of containers had been reduced.
This allowed most processing lines to be relocated and reconﬁgured on a single ﬂoor in the
plant. However the number of cooking areas and packing lines had been maintained so that
EDS would have sufﬁcient capacity to respond quickly to customer needs. The plant had also
adopted year-round operations using two shifts a day.
EDS had upgraded its equipment, spending $6 million on state-of-the-art technology
bought from manufacturers around the world. Specialized equipment was introduced as
cooking areas and packing lines were dedicated to particular products. For example, a fully
automated ketchup line had been installed. This line included a continuous ﬂow, computer-
controlled cooker which was connected directly to the packing line through a pipeline so that
product ﬂowed directly from cooking to packing. The controlling computer’s software was
Exhibit 2
Changes in product lines, E.D. Smith and Sons, Ltd., 1987 and 1992
1987 1992
Sales Products Sales Products
$Millions Number $Millions Number
Blended fruits 31 300 41 250
Tomato based sauces 13 80 18 200
Specialty sauces 15 8 17 50
Pickles 25 60 ——
Vegetable juices 3 6 ——
Total 87 500 76 500
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product, to produce a product which had better color and ﬂavor, to reduce cooking times
from 20 to 5 minutes, to increase yields, to speed up production, and to cut costs by
eliminating 20 workers from the line. Another example of new technology was the incor-
poration of high-speed packing equipment on some lines. EDS’s engineering costs and
depreciation expenses were higher than those of its competitors because of the cost of setting
up and running this equipment.
Operations had become focused on serving customers in four ways. First, a quality
improvement process based on conformance to customer requirements had been introduced.
This was a customized process based on Phil Crosby’s approach to managing quality.
Quality was speciﬁed as “conformance to requirements” and the cost of failing to meet these
requirements indicated how far the company was from its quality goal. Second, all workers
had been taught problem solving and given more responsibility to help them satisfy these
requirements. Third, the company had adopted an aggressive approach to potential sources
of customer dissatisfaction. For example, a customer had given EDS a recipe with a mistake
in it. A plant worker caught the mistake but not before the product had been shipped. EDS
immediately informed the customer, took back the product and reprocessed it. Fourth, the
company had adopted a “can do” attitude. Lew commented, “Our goal is to meet all customer
needs. We’ll accept a customer order even before we have the necessary equipment because
we’re conﬁdent that we can meet their needs. By serving their needs, we build our
capabilities.”
3.3. Marketing
In 1987, EDS’s ﬁve product lines (see Exhibit 2) were sold across Canada by a sales force
of 40 representatives and in Newfoundland by a broker. EDS’s major markets were Ontario
and Quebec because most of its products were heavy relative to their value. All products
were distributed to customers through EDS’s own trucking ﬂeet of 10 tractors and 6 trailers.
The sales force sold products carrying national brands and controlled labels. National
brands accounted for seventy percent of the company’s revenues. These brands included
those it owned outright (E.D. Smith), those it owned for particular products (Stafford and
SunRype) and ﬁnally those for which it held Canadian licenses (Lea & Perrins, and HP
sauces). Sales representatives had considerable latitude when selling these brands to cus-
tomers. This created considerable confusion in the company’s billing department because
representatives did not always inform head ofﬁce of the deals they had struck. Management
was trying to rectify this problem by installing Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) so
customers could order directly from EDS using electronic methods. Controlled label prod-
ucts were sold according to standard industry practice. EDS had developed a range of recipes
for key products it was prepared to manufacture and that it thought would sell. Its repre-
sentatives approached customers with samples and asked them if they wanted to use one for
their controlled label program. Some customers such as Loblaw insisted on an exclusive
supply contract. In such cases, EDS would use the recipe to make product for only that
customers. Other customers then had to select from the remaining recipes EDS was prepared
to use to make product.
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had been given numerous awards by advertising associations for the work it had done. In
1987 the staff had just ﬁnished a two-year study of consumers. Using the results of this study,
a new line of E.D. Smith brand jams was launched in 1989. The program included new
packaging, new labeling, a quality seal, a warranty statement on each container, and a
redesigned corporate logo. Around the same time a television advertising campaign, featur-
ing Lew Smith and promoting the company as Canadian and family-owned, was conducted
in Ontario and Quebec.
By 1992 EDS’s sales staff had been reduced to ﬁve sales representatives, three key
account managers, and 20 part-time merchandisers while brokers were used in smaller
markets. Nearly all ordering and billing was done electronically using EDI with terms of
sales being agreed upon before product was shipped. Distribution of product had been
outsourced too, but EDS still had two tractors and three trailers to expedite shipments and to
pick up ingredients.
Two product lines had been sold off, leaving EDS with three lines: (1) blended fruit
products which included jams, jellies, pie ﬁllings and fruit toppings; (2) tomato-based sauces
which included ketchup, and chili, pizza, spaghetti and salsa sauces; and (3) specialty sauces,
which included meat and ethnic sauces. EDS maintained a product line of 500 different
products over the period, though the composition of the product line had changed (Exhibit
2). The geographic distribution of sales had changed little over the period because EDS
acquired brands that allowed it to maintain market presence in spite of the reduction in the
number of product lines. For example, selling the vegetable juice business had severely
Table 1
Comparative prices and discounts for a standard unit of product
EDS NBM CLM
Price $1.12 $1.36 $1.05
Discounts and allowances 0.12 0.27 0.05
Net revenue 1.00 1.09 1.00
Exhibit 3




National brands 2,500 1,520
Controlled labels 700 1,380
Food service 900 550
Industrial 400 450
Mass merchandisers — 60
Export — 40
Total 4,500 4,000
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which held signiﬁcant market share in Quebec. The Laura Secord brand business was bought
in 1989 and the Habitant brand business in 1990. These acquisitions also maintained plant
volume.
Nationally branded product represented only 40 percent of EDS’s sales by 1992. Man-
agement had found it much harder to grow the national brand business than the controlled
label business. To Lew, the introduction of the new line of E.D. Smith jams illustrated the
problem. Following initial success, EDS had been unable to sell the quantities it had hoped
to at prices above those of other national brands. This limited its ability to promote the jams
Exhibit 4









Controlled labels 11. 11.
Jam—Ontario
Campbells** 6. *
E.D. Smith 9. 15.
Kraft 18. 15.
Other 40. 36.
Controlled labels 27. 34.
Jam—Quebec
Campbells** 19 *











Lea & Perrins 48. 48.
Heinz 40. 39.
Other 2. 3.
* Now part of E.D. Smith.
** Campbells Soup Co owned the Habitant and Laura Secord brands in 1987.
Source: Company records.
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Still, EDS was able to hold signiﬁcant market share in the markets its brands served (Exhibit
3). Meanwhile volume in the controlled label business had grown considerably though the
number of these customers was down. The customers were mostly food retailers who bought
Exhibit 5
Proﬁt and loss statements for E.D. Smith and Sons, 1992 (in million of dollars)*
Revenue 89.1
Disc. and allow. 13.1
Net revenue 76.0













Net margin B.I.T. 2.4
Interest 0.8
Net margin B.T. 1.6
* The company’s ﬁnancial data have been disguised to protect its conﬁdentiality.
Exhibit 6
Balance sheet for E.D. Smith and Sons, Ltd., 1992 (in millions of dollars)*
Assets Liabilities and equity
Current assets Current liabilities
Cash 1.1 Notes payable 4.3
Trade receivables 3.8 Current LTD 0.6
Inventory 6.3 Trade payables 3.5
Other 0.6 Income tax payable 0.2
Total current assets 11.8 Other current liabilities 1.8
Fixed assets 8.0 Total current liabilities 10.4
Intangibles 0.4 Long term debt 3.5
All other 1.0 Deferred taxes 0.4
Total assets 21.2 All other liabilities 0.4
Total liabilities 14.7
Net worth 6.5
Total liabilities and net worth 21.2
* The company’s ﬁnancial data have been disguised to protect its conﬁdentiality.
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products sold under Loblaw’s “President’s Choice” label had increased its business with
Loblaw to nearly $20 million and had also attracted other food retailers to the company.
The number of people employed in the marketing function had been reduced substantially,
including the elimination of its internal marketing research capability. Lew explained, “A lot
of marketing research is navel gazing. Now we learn what we need to know by talking with
customers.”
The result of EDS’s marketing activities was that it offered products at an average list
price between that of a National Brand Manufacturer (NBM) and that of a Controlled Label
Manufacturer (CLM). See Table 1.
3.4. Research and development
EDS’s management never believed the company’s role was to pioneer basic research on
food products–it relied on suppliers for that research. It chose to dedicate the company’s
resources to product development, thereby focusing on customers. In 1987, EDS had one
food technologist and two technicians. By 1992, it had three food technologists and six
technicians. This group was able to formulate a new product within a week and get it in
production within one or two months. EDS’s competitors took one or two months to
formulate a new product and three to four months to get it into production.
3.5. Finance
In 1987, Lew Smith and Richard Sexton determined the ﬁnancial resources the company
would need to support their plans. To create the ﬁnancial base needed, they cut the overhead
burden and sold several associated business. Finished goods inventories were down by 40
percent with EDS’s just-in-time manufacturing policy. By 1992, EDS’s ﬁnancial situation
was much improved. EDS’s ﬁnancial statements for 1992 appear as Exhibits 5 and 6.
3.6. Administration
In 1987, Lew described the company as “bogged down in bureaucracy” and holding too
many meetings. Administrative systems, especially for sales, were too rigid to deal with the
ﬂexibility allowed the employees.
By 1992, several administrative services had been out-sourced, the number of man-
agers and secretaries had been pared down and the organization’s structure reshaped to
support the change in behavior. EDS’s organizational chart for 1992 appears as Exhibit
7. The company had also invested $1 million in a computerized information system that
was now essential to the way it operated. Virtually all EDS’s information was on a
centralized system that was accessible to employees through 105 terminals spread
throughout EDS’s facilities.
4. The US opportunity
Building a plant in the US was not a new thought to Lew. Lew made public comments
about wanting EDS to be a North American company in 1988. He had held back from
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Now he felt the company had reached the point where it was ready to sell product in the US.
Lew said,
One of the best indicators of our readiness is our success with customers. We have not lost
a customer in four years. We haven’t lost a controlled label customer in 25 years and we’re
getting 90 percent of the bids we quote on. I could not think of a better test of our readiness
to go into the US.
Lew also felt positive because executives with several retail customers, including A&P
and Loblaw, were encouraging EDS to sell product in the US. They were familiar with the
success of “premium” controlled brands in Canada and wanted to extend the concept into the
US. Recently, Loblaw had arranged for seven US manufacturers to manufacture products
carrying its “President’s Choice” premium brand.
EDS started making sales calls in the US in the spring of 1992. By July, sales to
customers in New York, Illinois, and Texas were generating 4 percent of EDS’s sales
revenue. All product sold to US customers was under controlled labels. Much more
business appeared possible as many US retailers were approaching EDS for quotes. Said
one employee, “The phones were ringing all day.” Of particular interest was a request
by Wal-Mart, a prominent mass merchandiser, for a quote on major quantities of product
for its Sam’s Club stores. A necessary condition for EDS to secure this business was that
the products be made in the US.
Lew reﬂected on EDS’s experiences so far, “US customers aren’t the same as Canadian
customers. They are price-oriented. Service and quality are secondary. If you want to
compete, you have to be able to match market prices and these have been set already.”
Another feature of the US market was that, while the retail food business was nearly ten
times larger ($211 billion versus $28 billion in 1989), there were proportionally fewer large
chains in the US than in Canada. In the US market, chains with over 200 stores accounted
for 44% of total sales while in Canada they accounted for 84%. Lew wondered if this would
affect what customers wanted and limit potential.
EDS’s principal US competitors appeared to be Redwing, a subsidiary of Rank-Hovis-
McDougall, and Torbit and Castleman, a company owned by a venture capital group
based in Seattle. Both companies were similar to EDS. They manufactured controlled
labels; produced a similar line of products including ketchup, sauce, jam, and salad
dressing; and were improving their product development capability. They were well
entrenched in the US market and were well ﬁnanced but neither was growing as fast as
the market served.
Lew was now thinking about buying a plant in the southern US. This plant could be used
to supply most of the US while the plant in Winona could supply Canada and the north-
eastern US. He wanted a plant with two million cases capacity a year and room for further
expansion. He thought that the plant could be tied into EDS’s computerized information
system and could use the same processing processes as EDS, but it would have to have
different operating policies and separate ﬁnancial statements.
Questions Lew had about the expansion were how much the company could afford to pay
for a facility, and whether the company should be making such a commitment to controlled
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In talking with fellow Canadian businessmen, he had heard that southern workers had a more
relaxed attitude to work and often had limited work skills.
Appendix: Note on Canadian grocery products manufacturing
The manufacturers of grocery products focus on producing branded, packaged food
products sold through retail establishments. The overall ﬂow of grocery products is illus-
trated in Appendix Exhibit 1. This note describes the competitive forces affecting the
proﬁtability of the industry. Analysis of these forces is complicated by the food retailers’ own
strategic agenda which meant that retailers wanted brands they owned on products they sold.
The consequence was two types of brands; brands owned by the manufacturers (“national
brands” or “regional brands”) and brands owned by wholesalers and retailers (“controlled
labels”). Controlled labels could be further divided into three sub-types: “premium” brands
which were superior in quality to national brands, “private” brands which were similar or
somewhat lower in quality than national brands, and “generic” brands which were markedly
lower in quality than national brands. All these products sat on the retailers’ shelves,
competing for the consumers’ dollar.
1. The competitors
In 1992 the Canadian grocery products industry was highly competitive with manufac-
tures tending to focus on producing either “national brand” or “controlled label” products.
Representative proﬁt and loss statements for companies specializing in either type appear in
Appendix Exhibit 2. For companies in the industry, the average ratio for sales to total assets
was 2:1, the ratio for sales to net ﬁxed assets was 8:1, and the ratio for sales to working
capital was 12:1.
National Brand Manufacturers (NBMs) sought to dominate their chosen markets with
their own brands. Most NBMs were divisions of large multi-nationals. They included Kraft
General Foods Canada with sales of $1.6 billion and Heinz Co. of Canada with sales of $500
million. But there were also some large Canadian companies such as Culinar with sales of
$600 million. Through the 1980s, many NBMs had increased their market shares through
mergers and acquisitions. In addition, many multi-nationals with Canadian subsidiaries had
taken their subsidiaries private by buying all their public shares.
NBMs marketed both to customers–wholesalers and retailers–and to consumers. Custom-
ers were encouraged to buy the product through various concessions that, in effect, lowered
the price the manufacturer received below list prices. Their list prices were 30 percent higher
than those of controlled label manufacturers. For example, the list price of a product from a
controlled label manufacturer would be $1.05 while that of a similar product from an NBM
would be $1.36. The actual price of nationally branded products was reduced, however,
through the heavy allowances and discounts given to retailers–discounts given by NBMs
were as much as ﬁve times greater than those given by CLMs. These discounts and
allowances reduced the effective price difference between the two types of brands.
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promotion by the manufacturer. NBMs advertising heavily rarely lost market share; the
losers tended to be those manufacturers which did not. In addition, NBMs used premium
quality packaging to capture consumers’ attention in the store. This was important given that
66 percent of consumers’ purchases were unplanned.
The costs of NBMs were inﬂuenced by several factors. Building and maintaining brands
was expensive, even for larger companies. Many NBMs were multi-nationals so were able
to lower these costs by sharing activities and experience across various national markets.
They also spent heavily on producing new products that matched changing consumer
interests and that took advantage of technological innovation. They were able to ease the
entry of their new products into the market by putting their well-known brand names on
them. The volume produced by NBMs gave them a shipping advantage over smaller
manufacturers; they could ship full truck loads of product to customers while smaller
manufacturers could not.
Controlled Label Manufacturers (CLMs) worked to produce satisfactory products at the
lowest possible cost. While their direct manufacturing costs were similar to those of NBMs,
Appendix Exhibit 2
Comparison of proﬁt and loss statements for a national brand and a controlled label manufacturer, 1992













In percent In cents per unit
Revenue 125.0 105.0 136.5 105.0
Disc. and allow. 25.0 5.0 27.3 5.0
Net revenue 100.0 100.0 109.2 100.0
Cost of goods
Sold
Labor 8.2 9.5 9.0 9.5
Materials 28.4 32.5 31.0 32.5
Packaging 25.6 27.0 28.0 27.0
Other 4.6 5.5 5.0 5.5
Total 66.8 74.5 73.0 74.5
Gross margin 33.2 25.5 36.2 25.5
Freight 4.6 6.0 5.0 6.0
Marketing 12.8 3.0 14.0 3.0
R & D 0.9 0.5 1.0 0.5
Administration 5.5 8.0 6.0 8.0
Depreciation 1.8 2.0 2.0 2.0
Total 25.6 19.5 28.0 19.5
Net margin BIAT 7.5 6.0 8.2 6.0
Interest 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0
Net margin BT 6.6 5.0 7.2 5.0
Source: Industry personnel.
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company differentiated itself. Most differentiated themselves by specializing in a limited
range of products. This, together with their smaller size, meant that many were not well
known by potential customers. The CLMs often gained their credentials as a reputable
manufacturer by producing products for a dominant and respected retailer. This created a
relationship with the retailer that other retailers sometimes saw as an allegiance, discouraging
them from buying from the particular manufacture because they “did not want to support
someone who was working with a competitor.” Another concern was whether a manufacturer
would be able to supply the large volume needed by a retail food chain.
Occasionally the largest retailers and wholesalers manufactured their own controlled label
products. In recent years, however, they had preferred to buy products from manufacturers.
Retailing had become so competitive that retailers felt they needed all available funds to
upgrade their own retailing operations.
A few companies sold national brands and also manufactured some controlled labels, such
as E. D. Smith (EDS). Producing controlled labels helped cover overhead and provided a
market for surplus product. Sometimes the only difference between the national brand and
controlled label was the packaging. But for the manufacturer who tried to meet unique
product speciﬁcations requested by the customer, manufacturing was more difﬁcult. Some
companies manufacturing controlled label products also sold products to NBMs.
2. Customers
Customers of grocery product manufacturers included retailers, food services and other
manufacturers (See Appendix Exhibit 3). Analysts predicted that there would be fewer
combination food stores in future because the industry was over-stored. Each market would
be left with two or three retail food chains and fewer independents. The number of grocery,
confectionery and sundries stores would also decline as combination stores lengthened their
store hours. The biggest competitive challenge to combination stores appeared to be ware-
house clubs.
Appendix Exhibit 3




Combination* 18,581 10,702 29,283
Grocery, confect. & sundries** 2,139 6,237 8,376
All other 337 2,823 3,136
Total 21,057 19,762 40,819
Department stores 339
Total food sales 41,158
* Supermarkets.
** Convenience and specialty stores.
Source: Statistics Canada.
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Food sales varied by province (See Appendix Exhibit 4) while within each province sales
were dominated by a few chains which beneﬁted from centralized buying and distribution
(Appendix Exhibit 5). Each company sought to maximize volume by supplying multiple
“banners.” For example, George Weston and Co.’s retailing division, the Loblaw Compa-
nies., had stores in Ontario under the Ziggy’s, Mr. Grocer, Fresh Mart, Value Mart, Fortino,
Loblaw, and Zehr banners. The Great A&P Tea Company supplied stores under the A&P,
Miracle, and Dominion banners. Each banner had a different marketing mix which appealed
to a particular segment of consumers.
Food retailers sought to maximize sales dollars per linear foot by carefully controlling the
15,000 or so items carried in the standard supermarket. Point-of-sale terminals and products
marked with universal product codes greatly assisted them in this effort. Any product that did
not provide sufﬁcient margin or sufﬁcient turnover to generate the desired proﬁt per linear
foot of shelf space was soon replaced. This approach made it increasingly important that a
new product be unique to be attractive to retailers.
In recent years, food retailers had become more reliant on price competition. This had
made them increasingly sensitive to the cost of goods sold as their gross margin averaged 20
percent of sales and their net margin averaged only 1 percent of sales.
Retailers carried both national brands and controlled labels. Controlled labels were more
important in Western Canada than in Ontario. They were also more important in Canada
where they accounted for 20 percent of the grocery product sales than in the United States
(US) where they accounted for only 14 percent. Their importance was increasing in both
countries and was expected to grow faster in the US.
Appendix Exhibit 4




Maritimes 2,545 796 724 4,065
Quebec 2,396 7,606 2,049 12,051
Ontario 9,066 4,281 1,116 14,463
Manitoba 1,170 261 178 1,609
Saskatchewan 767 405 160 1,332
Alberta 3,074 949 131 4,154
British Columbia 3,566 1,717 254 5,537
Total 22,584 16,015 4,612 43,211
* Four or more stores under a single owner.
** Independents (1–3 stores per owner) operating in a major or secondary way under a wholesale-sponsored
program. Typically they shared a common banner with other independents.
Source: Canadian Grocer.
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Food retailers carried national brands because consumers expected stores to have them.
Retailers did not feel obliged, though, to carry all national brands. Robert Chenaux of
Loblaw said, “A retailer is only going to carry a national brand which is number one or two
in market share for its product category.” The decision about which national brands were
stocked was tempered in several ways. Large retailers generally preferred to deal with a few
large manufacturers who had full lines of products as this reduced transactions costs.
Sometimes retailers would carry national brands with weaker market shares if their manu-
facturers were willing to make greater price and non-price concessions. The retailer gave the
most signiﬁcant national brand it carried in each product category the most and the best shelf
space. The retailer’s controlled label, if it had one, would be located close by.
Food retailers continually pressured NBMs for lower prices. If the manufacturers were
unwilling to lower prices overall, retailers asked for products at low prices for approximately
six promotions a year. Retailers typically overbought products at the promotional prices and
later sold them at the regular prices. Industry sources estimated that 50 percent of the product
retailers bought at promotional prices was later sold at regular retail prices. Retailers also
tried to get as many non-price beneﬁts as possible, including liberal delivery and return
policies.
Food retailers charged NBMs for merchandising activities they performed for the national
brands. For example, they charged manufacturers for in-store product displays when retailers
Appendix Exhibit 5
Provincial market shares of major food retailers, 1992
Company Banners
used/served
Mar.* Que. Ont. Man. Sas. Alb. B.C.
Number In percent
Distributors
Canada Safeway 2 –– – 33 19 28 20
Federated Co-ops 1 19 ––10 27 18 –
Great A&P Co. 3 –– 18 –– – –
Loblaw Cos. 11 18 – 25 21 30 12 9
Metro-Richelieu 5 – 33 9 –– – –
Oshawa Group 6 10 13 10 5 7 11 3
Overwaitea 2 –– – – – 73 4
Provigo 2 – 23 –– –––
Sobeys 2 35 –––– ––
Warehouse Clubs
CostCo 1 –– – 44 6 4
Price Club 1 – 73–– – 1
Other 18 24 35 27 15 18 27
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Compiled from industry sources.
* Mar. means the Maritime provinces of New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia and Newfound-
land.
“..” means no market share in that area.
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Retailers also charged manufacturers for the privilege of having the product included in the
retailer’s newspaper advertising. Furthermore, food chains typically charged NBMs a “slot-
ting fee” of approximately $20,000 to add a new product to a store, though the fee varied
depending on the bargaining power of the manufacturer. Some retailers also charged a failure
fee if the product proved unsuccessful. Manufacturers treated these charges as allowances
and discounts from sales revenue which had been valued at list prices.
Retailers’ demands for beneﬁts and allowances were offset by the manufacturers’ own
direct advertising and promotion. Retailers asked for fewer discounts the more a manufac-
turer spent on its own, promoting and advertising its national brand.
4. Use of controlled labels
Food retailers viewed controlled label and national brand products as substitutes. Typi-
cally the products were similar in quality but controlled label products were sold at lower
prices. Retailers hoped that consumers would come to the store because of the national
brands but, after comparing them with controlled labels, buy the latter. Retailers were able
to sell controlled label products for less than national brands because the net wholesale price
of national brand products was approximately 9 percent higher. Thus the net price of a
similar product to the retailer would be $1.00 from the CLM and $1.09 from the NBM. This
meant that retailers received higher margins on controlled label products and, if the consumer
liked them, the controlled label developed consumer loyalty to the store.
The owner of the controlled label bore responsibility for product development, label
design, product quality, and product promotion. Substantial volume was necessary to justify
these activities. Those who lacked the volume needed to support these activities internally
relied on manufacturers to perform them.
Over the past decade, retailers had tested alternative approaches to controlled labels. In the
early 1980s generically labeled products of lower quality were offered at prices signiﬁcantly
lower than national brands. This approach had proved unsuccessful. More recently Loblaw
Cos. had tried the premium label approach with its “President’s Choice” label. Loblaw,
through its Loblaws International Merchants Division, had developed a range of “President’s
Choice” products along with a merchandising program. The products carrying this label were
superior in quality but sold at prices similar to national brands. By 1992 Loblaw was selling
$750 million each year of “President’s Choice” products. It had more than 1,000 of these
products in Canada and half as many in the US. Other retailers were starting to copy
Loblaw’s premium label approach. Analysts expected that 1 or 2 chains in each market
would successfully copy Loblaw’s approach.
Loblaw had decided to build on its success in Canada and in the US Midwest where it
owned the National Supermarkets. It started licensing US food retailers by geographic area
to carry it products and use its merchandising program. By 1992 it had signed up Lucky
Supermarkets in Southern California and Tom Thumb in Texas. The products that carried the
“President’s Choice” brand were made by grocery product manufacturers according to
Loblaw’s speciﬁcations. Under the licensing arrangement, however, manufacturers worked
directly with the licensed retailers while Loblaw collected a fee on all the business. Loblaw’s
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wanted generic copies of successful national brands.
4.1. Other retailers
Other retailers were selling more food products in order to maintain growth in maturing
retail markets. These retailers included warehouse clubs (Price Club and Costco Wholesale),
mass merchandisers (K Mart), and deep-discount drug chains. All were selling grocery
products at prices below those of food retailers. Warehouse clubs appeared to offer the most
serious competitive challenge to food retailers. In 1991 they accounted for only four percent
of Canadian retail sales. In the US, where they had been established for ﬁve more years, they
accounted for 14 percent. By the year 2000, 20 percent of US food sales were forecasted to
go through these stores.
Warehouse clubs offered top selling national brands, on average 4,000 items, at lower
prices per unit and sometimes in larger packs than traditionally available at food retailers.
They used minimal promotion, relying instead on word of mouth. Warehouse clubs had
annual sales of $1,000 per square foot versus food retailers sales of $450 per square foot but
operated on a retail markup of only 10 percent. Food manufacturers anticipated that clubs
would carry controlled labels as well as national brands in future.
The economics of warehouse stores were different than regular supermarkets because they
operated differently. Their real estate costs were lower because they built their facilities on
land zoned for industrial rather than retail use. They were able to do this because they were
“clubs,” limiting membership and charging each member an annual membership fee of $25.
Their operating costs were lower, in part, because their stores were large (100,000 square
feet), austere facilities in which they provided few services. In addition, they bought the
merchandise they sold at low prices, typically paying “dead net” prices–prices which
excluded all rebates, discounts, and allowances that manufacturers normally provided.
Warehouse clubs tried to reduce price further by arguing that sales representatives did not
have to call on them.
Food retailers were concerned by the growth of warehouse clubs. They felt that manu-
facturers were selling to clubs at “incremental prices.” As a result, retailers commonly asked
manufacturers to justify the prices retailers paid versus the prices clubs paid. If retailers were
not convinced that manufacturers were practicing “fair” pricing, they could retaliate with
actions ranging from reducing merchandising support to dropping the nationally branded
product from their stores.
4.2. Food services
A great variety of food service businesses bought products from grocery product manu-
facturers. Some bought nationally branded products such as jam and butter in portion-packs
so they could put the same brands in front of the customer that most bought for home
consumption. These businesses also bought many controlled label products in larger con-
tainers or as unbranded product in bulk which were used in commercial kitchens. The smaller
food services often bought from food wholesalers who provided credit and service. The
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were more interested in low prices, product that met their speciﬁcations, and delivery when
needed.
4.3. Food manufacturers
Large food manufacturers bought some products from specialized manufacturers. These
products were usually bought in bulk and were then used in manufacturing value-added
products (for example, jam was bought to be used as ﬁlling in pastry items). These
manufacturers bought based on price and meeting speciﬁed quality requirements
5. Consumers
Consumers liked branded products because they were assured consistency in quality and
value. But consumer preferences were changing in other respects. They were showing less
loyalty to retail banners. They also wanted new and different products. This was reﬂected in
their growing interest in ethnic foods, for example pasta and Mexican foods. In addition
consumers wanted food products with fewer additives (preservatives, artiﬁcial ﬂavors and
colouring agents), less fat, less sodium, and fewer calories. Consumers also wanted more
products compatible with their meal needs. This included products which could upgrade their
home cooking, allowing them to substitute meals at home for meals out. Finally, they wanted
products that made meals easier to prepare, serve and clean up after.
Consumers were showing increasing interest in prices as well, according to a survey done
for the Canadian Grocer. Seventy two percent of consumers said price had become their most
important consideration while 45 percent gave better prices as the reason they had switched
stores. Manufacturers’ perception of consumers’ interest in prices was that they suffered
from a “high price-high deal syndrome.” Consumers, they said, expected to be able to buy
major brands periodically on sale at signiﬁcantly lower prices. They were less interested in
every-day lower prices. A segment of consumers, though, was willing to pay higher prices
for unique products of higher quality.
A recent phenomenon that concerned retailers was cross-border shopping. Many consum-
ers were driving from Canada to the US to do their shopping because prices there were
cheaper–a comparison of selected food prices appears in Appendix Exhibit 6. In 1992 the
National Task Force on Cross Border Shopping reported that Canadian retail food prices
were higher than in the US because of higher wholesale prices of food products entering the
retail system rather than inefﬁciencies in the Canadian distribution system.
6. Suppliers
6.1. Inputs
Ontario food manufacturers bought most fruits and vegetables from Ontario farmers under
conditions which were heavily inﬂuenced by marketing boards. These boards were legally
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marketing” of their produce. Their views were facilitated by government regulations that
restricted Ontario processors from importing foreign produce and that imposed tariffs on
imported food products.
Under marketing boards, all farmers growing produce in Ontario received the same price.
Each processors had to post a bond each year before the harvest to ensure that farmers would
be paid for their produce if the processor was to have ﬁnancial difﬁculties. Each processor
also had to sign contracts with farmers in the spring of the year setting the amount of produce
the processor would buy. Farmers had to be paid upon delivery of their produce to the plant.
The net effect of marketing boards was that produce cost processors 15 percent more in
Ontario than in the US.
Processors outside Canada were able to buy fruits and vegetables from farmers under
more ﬂexible terms of sale. This meant that processors elsewhere had to pay more attention
to market conditions when buying. They could also buy in both the northern and southern
hemisphere, getting a new crop every six months.
Canadian companies were able to buy sugar at the world price. This was as much as 50
percent below the price of sugar in the US. US manufacturers, however, were able to use
sugar bought at world prices if the products made using it were exported.
6.2. Packaging
Manufacturers of grocery products used cans, plastic containers, glass jars and cardboard
cartons. Canada had few manufacturers of these products because of strong competition from
US manufacturers. As a result, prices were similar in both countries. The size of the customer
inﬂuenced prices, with larger customers paying as much as 20 percent less than smaller
customers.
Appendix Exhibit 6
Comparison of prices for selected grocery products between Canada and the US, May 1991*
Product In Canada In the US
In Canadian $s
Basket of food items 225.55 202.65
Kraft Miracle Whip salad dressing 3.47 2.77
Heinz ketchup 3.41 2.59
Hunts Thick N Rich tomato sauce 1.93 1.48
Alymer whole tomatoes 1.63 1.46
Kraft strawberry jam 3.90 2.60
* US prices were converted at the prevailing rate of exchange, $1 US  $1.18 Canada. All appropriate taxes
were included. Similar product sizes.
Source: A.C. Nielsen Co., A Comparative Study of Grocery Prices in Canada and the US, Prepared for
Agriculture Canada, May 1991.
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The industry producing food processing equipment was an international one in which few
Canadian manufacturers competed. Developments in food processing technology were few
and were usually developed by the equipment manufacturers. Once a new machine was
developed, its manufacturer tried to sell it to food processors around the world. Ontario
companies had ready access to this equipment and tariffs on it were waived if similar
equipment was not made in Canada.
7. Impact of the free trade agreement
The industry’s competitive situation changed following the signing by the Canadian and
US governments of the Free Trade Agreement in 1988. Under this agreement, barriers
restricting trade between the two countries were eliminated. Tariffs on ﬁnished goods were
eliminated immediately while those on raw products were to be eliminated over 10 years.
Immediately following the signing of the Agreement, many Canadian customers of Canadian
manufacturers went to US manufacturers and got price quotes. Then they told their Canadian
suppliers they would have to match the US prices (as much as 20 percent lower) or lose their
business. Not all Canadian manufacturers were affected at least in the short run. Those
unaffected either had licensing agreements for the Canadian market or had corporate product
mandates for particular products and markets.
The change in the geographic boundaries of the market due to free trade had additional
implications for manufacturers who had traditionally sold in only one of the countries or
were multi-national corporations. Canadian companies who had sold across Canada found
that their “national” brands were now regional brands in the North American context.
Meanwhile, US manufacturers such as Knott and Smuckers who had never been in Canada
started marketing there. They focused on the Toronto and Montreal markets because they did
not want the expense or bother of launching brand names and building distribution across
Canada. Finally, multi-national companies with operations in both countries rationalized
production on a North American basis where economics favored doing so.
The ability of Canadian manufacturers to compete in the larger North American market
was mixed. They did not appear to suffer signiﬁcant cost disadvantage, though there were
differences in costs. With respect to inputs, Canadian manufacturers continued paying higher
prices for Ontario farm produce and the lower world price for sugar. Canadian manufacturers
of some products with high sugar content obviously beneﬁted because of their access to the
US market. With respect to operating costs, the story was also a mixed one. Canadian plants
had been built to supply the smaller Canadian market. This meant that, by US standards, they
were smaller and more ﬂexible because the production run for any product was much
smaller. Consequently, they lacked the economies of scale of the large specialized plants
common in the US but had costs advantages when producing the volumes required to satisfy
niche markets in the US.
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